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JUSTICE ON TRIAL:
COURTROOM SKETCHES FROM THE
FEDERAL RODNEY KING TRIAL1
Mary Chaney
2
1. This work was originally produced for the following television newscasts: KTTV
Channel 11 (David Bryan, reporter; Jose Rios, news director) and KVEA Channel 52 (Manuel
Urquiaga, reporter; Fernando Lopez, news director).
2. Mary Chaney works as a courtroom artist, documenting major trials in Los Angeles
for television news. She has produced work for KTTV, KVEA, and NBC, as well as "A
Current Affair" and "Inside Edition." Recent shows include: "The Badge and the Brush,"
with the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department; "Where Angels Tread," street scenes of Los Ange-
les; and "A Tender Dignity," sketches from Tent City. Mary Chaney studied at Chouinard
Art Institute, Otis Art Institute, and Loyola University. Ms. Chaney holds copyright to all the
sketches contained herein.
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These sketches have been selected to tell the story of a trial, to approx-
imate the drama we witnessed during the federal Rodney King beating
trial As in all courtroom dramas, the last act is not written until the jury
surrenders its verdicts. As we hear the verdicts, we make rapid marks on
paper, some in ink, some in color; enough, we hope, for a cogent image.
Then we surrender the picture to the camera for brief moments on your







On February 16, 1993, the federal trial of four white Los Angeles
Police Department (LAPD) officers accused of violating the civil rights
of African-American motorist Rodney King began in the United States
District Court in Los Angeles. The defendants had been acquitted the
year before in a state criminal trial.
Assistant U.S. Attorney Steven Clymer led the federal prosecution
team. He was joined by Department of Justice Attorneys Barry Kowal-
ski and Alan Tieger, and Assistant U.S. Attorney Lawrence Middleton.
On February 25, 1993, Clymer opened the government's case before
a packed courtroom. The defendants were present with their counsel:
Laurence Powell with his lawyer, Michael Stone, Esq.; Stacey Koon with
Ira Salzman, Esq.; Timothy Wind with Paul DePasquale, Esq.; and Ted
Briseno with Harland Braun, Esq. Even though the jurors could be seen
in open court, courtroom artists were not allowed to detail the jurors'
features in their sketches so as to protect their anonymity.
Early in the case, the federal prosecutors called use-of-force expert
Sergeant Mark Conta, who testified that the officers used excessive force
during the last fifty seconds of the beating. Conta testified regarding
proper LAPD procedures, including proper use of the PR-24 police ba-
ton. Defendants attributed their actions to faulty LAPD training and
policies.
The federal prosecutors also called civilian witnesses to testify re-
garding their impressions of the altercation between King and the police.
Dorothy Gibson and the other civilian witnesses testified that King was
not acting in an aggressive or combative manner during the portion of
the beating they had observed.
Having been previously described in almost mythical proportions as
a "drug-crazed PCP monster," Rodney King defused the defense argu-
ment when he took the stand. King's testimony, although not substan-
tively crucial, was an important emotional moment during the trial. No
longer could the jury view the videotaped beating without thinking of the
human being they had seen and heard on the witness stand.
King presented himself as a sympathetic figure while testifying.
During eight hours of cross-examination, he never became agitated or
3. This summary of events was edited from the curator's notes, written by Professor
Laurie L. Levenson, that accompanied these sketches while on display at the Loyola of Los
Angeles Law School. These 13 sketches were part of a larger exhibition of Ms. Chaney's work
from this trial shown from August through December 1993. The Editors of the Loyola of Los
Angeles Law Review wish to express their gratitude to Ms. Chancy for graciously granting us
permission to reproduce this sampling for our readers.
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aggressive. At times, he even appeared vulnerable. For example, when
questioned about some of his prior statements, King had to ask the attor-
ney to read the testimony to him, either because he had lost his ability to
read (due to his injuries) or because he never had the ability (King never
completed high school).
Defendants claimed that they were unable to subdue King because
the Los Angeles Police Commission had prohibited the use of the
chokehold. In a dramatic courtroom presentation, witness Sergeant
Duke nearly rendered defense lawyer Salzman unconscious with a dem-
onstration of the chokehold as a restraint tool.
Perhaps the strongest witness for the defense was defendant Koon,
the only defendant who testified. Koon stated that he was the supervis-
ing sergeant who controlled the other officers' actions that evening. Ac-
cording to Koon, the officers were justified in beating King because he
posed a continuous threat to their safety.
California Highway Patrol Officer Melanie Singer devastated the de-
fense by describing, through her tears, how the defendants beat King
about the head. Singer's testimony, perhaps even more than the testi-
mony of Rodney King himself, communicated to trial observers the pain
and suffering caused by defendants' conduct that evening.
Some defense lawyers, such as Harland Braun, took a minimalist
approach toward defending the case. The sole evidence offered in de-
fendant Briseno's behalf was the boot he wore that evening. The prose-
cutors had claimed that Briseno stomped on King, but Braun tried to
persuade the jury that Briseno was seeking to hold King down to protect
him from further blows. Braun ironically referred to the boot as a "ballet
slipper."
Closing arguments began during the seventh week of trial. In a
three-hour closing argument, Clymer focused on the last fifty seconds of
the videotape, asking, "Who is in control? Who is aggressive and com-
bative?" His answer, of course, was that it was the defendants, not King.
Clymer emphasized how the defendants had distorted the events of that
evening in their reports to cover up their behavior. He asked the jury to
be the living voice of the Constitution and to find that the defendants had
acted unreasonably.
Michael Stone, defendant Powell's lawyer, emphasized the difficult
job that police have in protecting the public from the criminal element.
Stone claimed that Koon was in control and that there was no time for
the officers to preplan their actions: "They were facing the bull." Stone
argued that the defendants used force that, based upon their experience
and perceptions, appeared reasonable and necessary at the time.
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Following closing arguments from prosecution and defense, the ju-
rors were given their instructions. One week later, as the verdicts were
read, the defendants sat quietly. In a split verdict, defendants Koon and
Powell were convicted; Wind and Briseno were acquitted. The citizens
of Los Angeles remained calm after the verdicts, ready to begin the heal-
ing process. Justice itself had been on trial over those weeks and had
emerged victorious.
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COPPING AN ATTITUDE: RULE OF LAW LESSONS
FROM THE RODNEY KING INCIDENT
I. INTRODUCTION
We cannot make events. Our business is wisely to improve them
.... Mankind are governed more by their feelings than by rea-
son. Events which excite those feelings will produce wonderful
effects.1
We started off trying to set up a small anarchist community, but
people wouldn't obey the rules.2
The legal order and system of the United States is founded on the
rule of law. Americans absorb this axiom in junior high civics classes
and, as adults, store it in that part of the brain reserved for trivial pur-
suits, along with world geography and metric conversion tables. As
viewed in other countries, however, this bedrock of our system of justice
is of great importance. Indeed, many nations working to establish "gov-
ernments of laws, not of men" often look to the United States as a
model.'
Perhaps the U.S. legal order's greatest strength is its long tradition
of respect for and adherence to rule of law values. Recent events have
shown, however, that unquestioned adherence to a legal system assumed
to be based on these values can become a dangerous weakness. It can
lead to complacency toward needed change, or worse, blindness to obvi-
ous failures. Relying on a centuries-old presumption of fairness and
equality, citizens may be unaware or disbelieving of the express injustice
their legal system increasingly produces.
The Rodney King incident is a dramatic and painful example of this
problem. On March 3, 1991, the police apprehended Mr. Rodney King
after a high-speed chase. When Mr. King exited the car but failed to
comply with police commands, the police shot him with a Taser and beat
him with batons. Eighty-two seconds of home video captured the en-
1. THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS (Angela Partington ed., 4th ed. 1992)
(attributed to American revolutionary leader Samuel Adams 1722-1803).
2. ALAN BENNETT, GETTING ON act 1 (1972).
3. See Igor Grazin, The Rule of Law: But of Which Law? Natural and Positive Law in
Post-Communist Transformations, 26 J. MARSHALL L. Rav. 719 (1993); Paul B. Stephan III,
Further Thoughts on the Rule of Law and a New World Order, 26 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 739
(1993); William Webster, The Rule of Law in an Emerging World Order, 26 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 715 (1993).
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counter between Mr. King and the police; it was subsequently broadcast
worldwide. Thus began months of social discord for Los Angeles and
the nation-months filled with tension, fear, outrage, and at times vio-
lence. By now most of the specific criminal justice issues arising from the
incident have been resolved to some degree; however, the larger issues of
systemic injustice remain unanswered.
This Comment suggests that events comprising the Rodney King
incident-the beating, the trials, the civil unrest-send the message that
despite apparent adherence to rule of law values, the current system has
serious flaws that, if left unaddressed, may lead to a breakdown of the
legal order. Consequently, lawmakers, law enforcement personnel, and
citizens should immediately revisit the rule of law roots of our jurispru-
dence so that they have a basis from which to design and implement
necessary changes. To facilitate the process, this Comment first explores
the rule of law ideal-its purpose, function, and the specific values it
embodies4 -placing special emphasis on a rule of law value called the
attitude of legality.' Then it applies a comprehensive rule of law model to
several key events of the Rodney King incident, noting where the ideal
succeeded and where it failed.6 In conclusion, this Comment suggests
alternatives to some of the current practices used within the legal system
that no longer adhere to the rule of law ideal.7
II. RULE OF LAW THEORY
For justice exists only between men whose mutual relations are
governed by law; and law exists for men between whom there is
injustice .... This is why we do not allow a man to rule, but
rational principle, because a man behaves thus in his own inter-
ests and becomes a tyrant.'
A. Rule of Law: Its Purpose and Function
Several different conceptions of the rule of law ideal have developed
throughout the history of Western societies.9 Despite differences among
4. See infra part II.
5. See infra part II.E.
6. See infra part III.
7. See infra part IV.
8. ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, in 9 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 339,
382 (Robert M. Hutchins et al. eds. & W.D. Ross trans., 1952).
9. See GEOFFREY DE Q. WALKER, THE RULE OF LAW: FOUNDATION OF CONSTITU-
TIONAL DEMOCRACY 1 (1988); Lawrence B. Solum, Equity and the Rule of Law, in 36 No-
MOS: THE RULE OF LAW 120 (Ian Shapiro ed., forthcoming 1993) (page proofs on file with
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
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these conceptions, the fundamental purpose of the rule of law has re-
mained constant: to justify the legal order and legitimize the legal system
of a given society. 10 The rule of law ideal achieves its purpose in several
ways.
First, the rule of law serves as a theoretical blueprint for designing
an ideal legal system. It represents a synthesis of normative values and
processes that is grounded in precepts of natural justice, that promotes
and legitimizes the mechanisms of formal justice, and that is perceived by
those subject to its restraints as producing actual justice.11 Therefore,
perhaps it is better to conceive of the rule of law as a dynamic network of
interrelated, interdependent elements, 12 rather than as a monolith. As
one commentator has suggested, the "rule of law may not be a single
concept at all; rather, it may be ... a set of ideals connected more by
family resemblance than a unifying conceptual structure." 3
Second, the rule of law serves to protect the shared liberty interests
of all members of a society. 4 It does this by establishing a dynamic equi-
librium between power and law.1 5 Pure power is arbitrary might; law is a
system by which institutions channel power so that it "conform[s] with a
people's values and established patterns of expectation."1 6 Neither
10. See WALKER, supra note 9, at 41-42. The legal order is a composite of specific rights
and duties subject to the coercive force of the sovereign or state. See JOHN RAWLs, A THE-
ORY OF JuSTIcE 240 (1971). "It is reasonable to assume that even in a well-ordered society the
coercive powers of government are to some degree necessary for the stability of social coopera-
tion." Id. This order is implemented by a complex of positive laws, agency regulations and
orders, enforcement mechanisms, and administrative procedures that constitute the legal sys-
tem. See id. "The role of an authorized public interpretation of rules supported by collective
sanctions is precisely to overcome [the] instability [inherent in voluntary agreements]." Id.
11. See WALKER, supra note 9, at 1, 3. This sentence refers to three "types" of justice.
"Natural" justice is a moral concept of universal equality and fairness that exists independent
of particular human social ordering. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 8, at 382-83. "Formal" jus-
tice is justice achieved by adherence to the principle of equality or by obedience to a particular
system. RAWLS, supra note 10, at 58. As such, it is a political conception ofjustice. See JOHN
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 11 (1993). A formal justice system that is based on the rule
of law can incorporate notions of natural justice as fundamental precepts. See RAWLS, supra
note 10, at 238-39; see also ARISTOTLE, supra note 8, at 382 ("Of political justice part is
natural, part legal-natural, that which everywhere has the same force and does not exist by
people's thinking this or that; legal, that which is originally indifferent, but when it has been
laid down is not indifferent .... ."). The third type ofjustice, "actual" justice, is defined by this
Author as the sum of results produced by a given legal system as perceived by the citizens
subject to that legal system's coercive power.
12. WALKER, supra note 9, at 46-48 (describing rule of law as "dynamic equilibrium"); see
infra notes 126-31 and accompanying text.
13. Solum, supra note 9, at 121.
14. See RAwLs, supra note 10, at 239-40.
15. See WALKER, supra note 9, at 1, 47; infra notes 126-31 and accompanying text.
16. WALKER, supra note 9, at 1.
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power nor law alone will lead to a stable society. 17 As ends in them-
selves, power is coercive and unpredictable, and law can become inflexi-
ble and hence potentially oppressive.' Without rule of law values to
regulate the tension between these antagonistic forces, the dominance of
one over the other would likely lead to serious infringement or curtail-
ment of individual liberty. 19
Finally, the rule of law is a part of and offers support for the larger
network of systems that comprise the social order.2" Social order is a
complex of interrelated normative and descriptive systems that reflects-
through social custom and politically determined rules-shared notions
of justice, governance, politics, economics, and group and interpersonal
relationships.21 The primary function of social order is to accommodate
the tension, inherent in all human activity, between the common good
and the individual good, between obedience to the general will and pur-
suit of free will.22 A legal system based on rule of law values will en-
courage maximization of common good by promoting certainty, fairness,




20. "The rule of law is not a complete formula for the good society, but there can be no
good society without it." Id. at 42.
21. See RAWLS, supra note 11, at 11. Rawls uses the term "basic structure" to refer to the
less precise "social order." See id "By the basic structure I mean a society's main political,
social, and economic institutions, and how they fit together into one unified system of social
cooperation from one generation to the next." Id.
22. Rousseau was one of many to ponder this tension. His conclusion was that the two
were irreconcilable. JULES STEINBERG, LOCKE, ROUSSEAU, AND THE IDEA OF CONSENT 84
(1978). Thus, Rousseau set out to describe a form of government in which the individual,
when obeying the law, was in essence following his or her own free will. Id. His thesis on the
social contract was an attempt to lay the foundations for this type of self-governance by con-
sent. See JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1762), reprinted in 38 GREAT
BooKs oF THE WESTERN WORLD 387 (Robert M. Hutchins et al. eds. & G.D.H. Cole trans.,
1952).
"The problem is to find a form of association which will defend and protect with
the whole common force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each,
while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as
before " This is the fundamental problem of which the Social Contract provides the
solution....
... [E]ach man, in giving himself to all, gives himself to nobody; and as there is
no associate over whom he does not acquire the same right as he yields others over
himself, he gains an equivalent for everything he loses, and an increase of force for
the preservation of what he has.
Id. at 391.
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individual autonomy by deterring behavior that impinges on a person's
liberty interests.
23
In light of the rule of law's overarching purpose and function, the
network-of-ideals approach provides the best normative and descriptive
explanation of how the theory shapes a legal system, and how it fits the
legal order within the larger social order. Thus, a comprehensive rule of
law theory will combine the ideals of natural justice and the mechanisms
of positive justice with notions of interrelation, fluidity, and balance. Be-
cause many conceptions of rule of law theory fail to account for this mix
of values, rules, and flexibility, they have limited practical usefulness. A
brief overview of several different conceptions of rule of law theory will
illustrate this fact and help underscore the value of the network-of-ideals
approach.
B. The Constitutional Principle: Popular American Variant of the
Rule of Law
The idea of the rule of law is bred in the bone for most U.S. citizens.
Its origins date back to the foundations of democratic political thought.24
The common shorthand for this conception of rule of law theory is that a
free people are those governed by "the rule of law, not of men."25 Along
these same lines, a "government under law' 26 has been commonly under-
23. See the discussion of Rawls's rule of law conception infra notes 74-92 and accompany-
ing text, and Walker's twelve-point definition infra part II.D.
24. See, eg., ARISTOTLE, Politics, in 9 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD, supra
note 8, at 439. See generally WALKER, supra note 9, at 93-127 (describing early development
of rule of law from Athens to English colonies of North America); Ellis Sandoz, Fortescue,
Coke, and Anglo-American Constitutionalism, in THE ROOTS OF LIBERTY: MAGNA CARTA,
ANCIENT CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND THE ANGLO-AMERICAN TRADITION OF THE RULE OF
LAW I (Ellis Sandoz ed., 1993) [hereinafter THE ROOTS OF LIBERTY] (tracing roots of liberty,
inseparably entwined around concept of rule of law, from medieval Europe to eighteenth-
century revolutionary America).
25. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 24, at 485.
Now, absolute monarchy, or the arbitrary rule of a sovereign over.., a city which
consists of equals, is ... contrary to nature .... And the rule of law, it is argued, is
preferable to that of any individual.... Therefore he who bids the law rule may be
deemed to bid God and Reason alone rule, but he who bids man rule adds an element
of the beast ....
Id.
26. This phrase is attributed to John Adams. JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS
381 (15th ed. 1980) (noting that phrase latter incorporated in Massacuhusetts Constitution,
first appeared in tract printed under Adams's pseudonym in Boston Gazette in 1774).
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stood as synonymous with "rule of law."27 Thus, the rule of law has
developed into an essential principle of constitutional democracy.2"
This iteration of the rule of law ideal provided the basis upon which
the founders of the United States chose to reject a monarchy and to cre-
ate a revolutionary system of self-government among equals operating
under a written constitution. 29 As a political tool, it has been used
grandly to justify the separation of powers3" and intimately to offer an
equitable remedy for an injured plaintiff.31 Additionally, it has lent sup-
port for the proposition that government not only must operate through
the positive law, but also must be subject to its power.
This popular American variant of the rule of law reduces it to a
constitutional truism that is far too limiting.32 First, it only focuses on
part of the rule of law ideal: rule of law as a tool of popular sover-
eignty.33 Although the rule of law is an integral part of constitutional
democracy, it has value to citizens on a more intimate level. It has a
27. See WALKER, supra note 9, at 2-3. Other common catch phrases that define the rule
of law as a political theory are: "free government .... liberty under law, Constitutional and
representative government, [and] republicanism." Sandoz, supra note 24, at 4.
28. See THE ROOTS OF LIBERTY, supra note 24, passim; WALKER, supra note 9, at 1-2.
29. Webster, supra note 3, at 715. For example, in Common Sense Thomas Paine pro-
claimed, "let a day be solemnly set apart... that in America THE LAW IS KING. For as in
absolute governments the King is law, so in free countries the law ought to be King; and there
ought to be no other." THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE (1776), reprinted in THE ESSENTIAL
THOMAS PAINE 23, 49 (1969). Both the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution
begin with reference to the foundational self-governing importance of the rule of law. See U.S.
CONST. pmbl. ("WE THE PEOPLE of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect
Union, establish Justice ...."). The Declaration of Independence states:
That, to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their
just powers from the consent of the governed;.., it is the right of the people... to
institute a new government, laying its foundations on such principles, and organizing
its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and
happiness.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
30. For a state example, see MASS. CONST. art. XXX.
In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative department shall never
exercise the executive and judicial powers of either of them: the executive shall never
exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them: the judicial shall never
exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them: to the end it may be
a government of laws and not of men.
Id. On the federal level, see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 49 (1803).
31. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 49. In order to reach his more momentous holding later
in the opinion, Chief Justice John Marshall first had to justify the Court's power to furnish the
disappointed Marbury some sort of remedy, and hence its jurisdiction to even consider the
case. He relied on the rule of law. "The government of the United States has been emphati-
cally termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high
appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right." Id. at 59.
32. See WALKER, supra note 9, at 2.
33. See id. at 2-3.
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juridical component that can guide the development of rules and proce-
dures by which specific conflicts are resolved in a way that is generally
perceived as just. Second, this conception is a chauvinistic perspective
that history refutes. Other nondemocratic forms of government, such as
theocracies, monarchies, and communist systems, can also operate in ac-
cord with the rule of law ideal.34 Finally, if the rule of law is viewed
solely as a concept of constitutionalism, it will rarely contribute much to
contemporary legal discourse in a mature constitutional government.
Thus, there must be more to the rule of law if it is to be significant and
relevant to the way modem Americans order their lives.
C. The Juridical Principle: Legal Conceptions of the Rule of Law
A number of legal philosophers consider the rule of law solely as a
component of positivist legal theory. This is largely due to the immense
influence of the work of A.V. Dicey, a legal positivist greatly influenced
by the Austinian35 school of classical positivism.36 Dicey's tripartite ap-
proach-a homage to sparse Austinian methodology 37-- has dominated
discourse on the subject.38 He posited his conception of the rule of law as
follows:
"That 'rule of law,' then, which forms a fundamental principle
of the constitution, has three meanings, or may be regarded
from three different points of view.
It means, in the first place, the absolute supremacy or pre-
dominance of regular law as opposed to the influence of arbi-
trary power, and excludes the existence of arbitrariness, of
prerogative, or even of wide discretionary authority on the part
34. Id. at 1, 12-13; cf Grazin, supra note 3 (discussing species of rule of law, albeit flawed,
that existed in Soviet Union); infra note 47 (debating whether rule of law existed in Nazi
Germany).
35. "Austinian" positivism is the brand of positivism made famous by the Englishman
John Austin (1790-1859), founder of English analytical jurisprudence. See RICHARD A.
COSGROVE, THE RULE OF LAW: ALBERT VENN DICEY, VICrORIAN JURIST 23 (1980). He is
remembered for his seminal work regarding the command-of-the-sovereign doctrine as well as
the separation theory of law and morality. The command-of-the-sovereign doctrine holds that
law is that which is publicly articulated by a sovereign and habitually obeyed by those persons
subject to the coercive power of that sovereign. Id at 24. Austin's separation theory holds
that what the law is and what the law ought to be are two separate and distinct inquires. Id. at
23. This was a direct response to natural law theory, which he believed led to the unnecessary
confusion of legal and moral questions. Id at 24.
36. Id. For a summary of Austin's influence on Dicey, see id. at 23-28.
37. Dicey was most influenced by Austinian methodology. Id. at 24. This methodology is
characterized by reducing a subject to a few principles of undoubted validity, and building a
comprehensive body of knowledge through the analysis of pertinent cases. See id. at 24-25.
38. See WALKER, supra note 9, at 128.
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of the government.... [A] man may with us be punished for a
breach of law, but he can be punished for nothing else.
It means, again, equality before the law, or the equal sub-
jection of all classes to the ordinary law of the land adminis-
tered by the ordinary law courts... [and] excludes the idea of
any exemption of officials or others from the duty of obedience
to the law.., or the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals ....
... [L]astly, [it] may be used as a formula for expressing
... that with us the law of the constitution.., are [sic] not the
source but the consequence of the rights of individuals, as de-
fined and enforced by the courts... thus the constitution is the
result of the ordinary law of the land."39
Since the turn of the century, Dicey's theory and the rule of law
generally have been attacked and discredited on a number of grounds.
40
One critic has labeled positivist formulations of the doctrine-with their
emphasis on the positive law and its pedigree4'-the "rule-book" concep-
tion.42 An oft-noted criticism of this conception of the rule of law is that
it strictly bifurcates the legal system into the procedural and substan-
tive-never the twain shall meet.43 This separation allows a legal system
with immoral substantive laws to justify them by instituting processes
that apparently operate in accord with rule of law procedural values.'
39. Id. at 129 (quoting ALBERT V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW
OF THE CONSTITUTION 202-03 (10th ed. 1960)).
40. For a discussion of the "century of criticism" inspired by Dicey's theory, see id. at
128-39.
41. "Pedigree" is shorthand for the more complex notion H.L.A. Hart calls the rule of
recognition. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 89-96 (1961). This rule embodies the
fundamental principles accepted by government officials and citizens as the necessary criteria
of validity by which a rule becomes law in a given legal system. Id.
42. Ronald Dworkin, Political Judges and the Rule of Law, in 64 PROCEEDINGS OF THE
BRITISH ACADEMY 259, 261 (1978).
[The rule-book approach] insists that, so far as is possible, the power of the state
should never be exercised against individual citizens except in accordance with rules
explicitly set out in a public rule book available to all. The government as well as
ordinary citizens must play by these public rules until they are changed, in accord-
ance with further rules about how they are to be changed, which are also set out in
the rule book.
Id. at 261-62.
43. Id. at 262.
[Tihose who have this conception of the rule of law do care about the content of the
rules in the rule book, but they say that this is a matter of substantive justice, and
that substantive justice is an independent ideal, in no sense part of the ideal of the
rule of law.
Id
44. This criticism is part of the general attack leveled against the separation theory, which
is at the core of positivist thought. See supra note 35.
[Vol. 27:675
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As examples, consider the "law-state" of Nazi Germany'5 or the whole-
sale importation of German racial law, despite a constitutional prohibi-
tion to the contrary, into Vichy France.' These legal systems produced
laws that were certain, general, and public, and had been validated by
appropriate government participation-legislatures enacted the laws and
independent courts and lawyers interpreted and applied them.47 Yet the
content of these laws was substantively corrupt because it sanctioned ra-
cial and ethnic discrimination. South African apartheid-legitimatized
by positive and common law4 -- is a recent example of this kind of cor-
ruption of the rule of law 9 that is only now being remedied.50
Since Dicey, some have narrowed the positivist approach to formal-
ist extremes by equating the rule of law to a law of rules.5" Indeed, this
cramped approach has lead some jurists to believe the rule of law is noth-
45. See WALKER, supra note 9, at 5.
46. See, eg., Richard H. Weisberg, Three Lessons from Law and Literature, 27 Loy. L.A.
L. REv. 285, 292-300 (1993).
47. Whether National Socialist Germany actually operated a rule of law legal system has
been the subject of debate. Compare H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and
Morals, 71 HARV. L. REv. 593, 617 (1958) (arguing that as reprehensible as content of Nazi
law was, it was still law, duly enacted and enforced) with Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity
to Law--A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. Rnv. 630, 650-51 (1958) (arguing that many
Nazi laws were "secret" and many judges and lawyers were under duress "from above" to
interpret laws favorably for government so that system did not produce law). Pursuant to
Walker's comprehensive twelve-point definition of the rule of law, see infra part II.D., these
types of laws would violate rule of law values of certainty, generality, and equality. See
WALKER, supra note 9, at 25. Perhaps the example of Vichy France offers a clearer illustra-
tion of rule of law values being used to legitimize an immoral legal system. See the discussion
of enactment and legal interpretation of racial laws even stricter than those of Nazi Germany
in Richard H. Weisberg, Legal Rhetoric Under Stress" The Example of Vichy, 12 CARDozo L.
REV. 1371 (1991); Weisberg, supra note 46, at 292-300.
48. JOHN DUGARD, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SouTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER 53-106
(1978).
49. See DAVID DYZENHANS, HARD CASES IN A WICKED LEGAL SYSTEM vii-ix, 49
(1991).
50. MARINA OTTAWAY, SoUTH AFRICA: THE STRUGGLE FOR A NEW ORDER (1993).
51. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175
(1989); see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 733 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("A govern-
ment of laws means a government of rules. Today's decision... is ungoverned by rule, and
hence ungoverned by law."). The focus of Justice Scalia's article concerns judicial discretion
and "the dichotomy between general rules and personal discretion within the narrow context
of law that is made by the courts." Scalia, supra, at 1176. His thesis is that judges, when
deciding particular cases, should strive to develop general rules so that judge-made law can
take on the rule of law values of legislatively enacted laws: equality, publicity, and predictabil-
ity. See id. at 1178-80. So highly does he regard the empowering constraints of the rule (book)
of law ideal that he states "[there are times when even a bad rule is better than no rule at all."
Id. at 1179. Unfortunately, he fails to give us any rule as to when that time would be.
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ing more than "law and order.' 5 2 In the popular media, the rule of law
is often employed in this way to denounce criminal behavior or social
upheaval.5 3 This simplistic view, however, has been widely repudiated. 4
Another school of thought inculcates its conception of the rule of
law with social, political, and moral principles that place requirements
on the substantive content of the law. This approach to the doctrine has
been called the "rights" conception.55 The Declaration of Delhi56 is an
example of this approach. It reads in part: "[T]he Rule of Law is a
dynamic concept... not only to safeguard and advance the civil and
political rights of the individual in a free society, but also to establish
52. DUGARD, supra note 48, at 43; see, ag., ABE FORTAS, CONCERNING DISSENT AND
CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 58-59 (1968).
This may seem harsh [to be sent to prison for defying laws that mandate racial
discrimination]. It may seem especially harsh if we assume that I profoundly believe
that the law I am violating is immoral and unconstitutional .... But this is what we
mean by the rule of law ....
... The state, the courts, and the individual citizen are bound by a set of laws
which have been adopted in a prescribed manner, and the state and the individual
must accept the courts' determinations of what those rules are and mean in specific
instances. This is the rule of law, even if the ultimate judicial decision is by the
narrow margin of five to four!
Id
53. E.g., Carol Morello, Rule of Law Returns to War-Torn Streets, PHILA. INQUIRER,
Dec. 13, 1992, at C3 (reporting that rule of law has returned to Beirut because former mili-
tiamen now spend their time issuing traffic tickets); Seth Mydans, Los Angeles Force Contains
Disorder, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1992, at A20 (quoting report issued by special commission
headed by William Webster: "'[T]he first priority for law enforcement must be to re-establish
an understanding that the rule of law still governs society.' "); Karen Tumulty, U.S. Crime
Rate Dips but Violent Offenses Climb, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1993, at Al (quoting FBI Director
Louis J. Freeh: " ' [C]rime is shockingly high in a country where the rule of law should
prevail.' ").
54. See, eg., HOwARD ZINN, DISOBEDIENCE AND DEMOCRACY 8-27 (1968).
[S]ome mystical value has been attached to "the rule of law", beyond those human
rights which law, way back in our democratic tradition, was set up to support....
Until American citizens can overcome this idolization of law, until they begin to see
that law is, like other institutions and actions, to be measured against moral princi-
ples, against human needs, we will remain a static society in a world of change, a
society deaf to the rising cries for justice-and therefore, a society in serious trouble.
Id. at 23.
55. Dworkin, supra note 42, at 262.
[The rights conception] insists that these moral and political rights be recognized in
positive law, so that they may be enforced upon the demand of individual citizens
through courts or other judicial institutions of the familiar type, so far as this is
practicable. The rule of law.., is the ideal rule by an accurate public conception of
individual rights.
Id
56. The Declaration of Delhi, along with detailed conclusions and proceedings, was pub-
lished in a report by the International Commission of Jurists, which met in New Delhi, India
in 1959. The Commission, which had 185 members, consisted of judges, practicing lawyers,
and law professors from 53 countries. INTERNATIONAL COMM'N OF JURISTS, THE RULE OF
LAW IN A FREE SOCIETY 3 (1959).
RULE OF LAW
social, economic, educational and cultural conditions under which his
legitimate aspirations and dignity may be realized.""7
Criticisms of the rights approach .focus on describing why rule of
law theory is ill-equipped to manage any real control over the substantive
content of the laws within a given system.58 A commonly noted weak-
ness is that the rights approach presupposes that citizens have moral
rights prior to the positive enactment of those rights.5 9 Many legal phi-
losophers believe that the notion that citizens have rights outside of those
bestowed on them by the positive law makes no sense at all." Further-
more, defining the nature and scope of human rights-whether bestowed
by law or by a higher source-is a difficult and perilous task.61 Thus,
reaching consensus on what those rights are is extremely difficult, and
deciding how to resolve differences of opinion is even more so.62 Witness
the turmoil surrounding the debate over a woman's right to choose abor-
tion in the United States-a country fairly unique in that it expressly
recognizes and protects an individual's inalienable rights through a writ-
ten constitution "with an entrenched Bill of Rights."'63 Thus, one of the
jurists in Delhi argued that if fundamental rights were to be part of a
universally accepted rule of law system, they should be limited to "nega-
tive rights"-freedoms from rather than freedoms to."
A third juridical conception of the rule of law has been called the
"institutions-principles-procedures" approach.6" This approach begins
with the assumption that the rule of law exists to some greater or lesser
57. IL
58. See WALKER, supra note 9, at 6.




63. See WALKER, supra note 9, at 10.
64. See INTERNATIONAL COMM'N OF JuRISTS, supra note 56, at 65. This negative free-
doms approach was implicitly sanctioned by the United States Supreme Court in Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
Although the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause affords protection against
unwarranted government interference with freedom of choice in the context of cer-
tain personal decisions, it does not confer an entitlement to such funds as may be
necessary to realize all the advantages of that freedom. To hold otherwise would
mark a drastic change in our understanding of the Constitution. It cannot be be-
cause government may not prohibit the use of contraceptives... government, there-
fore has an affirmative constitutional obligation to ensure that all persons have
financial resources to obtain contraceptives ....
Id. at 318; see also Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 797 (1985) ("As it has evolved in the decisions of this Court, the freedom recognized
by the Court in Roe v. Wade and its progeny is essentially a negative one .... ") (White, J.,
dissenting).
65. WALKER, supra note 9, at 14.
January 1994]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
degree in all common-law jurisdictions, as well as in countries where the
individual enjoys rights and remedies similar to those enjoyed by citizens
of common-law countries.6 6 Thus, by examining the principles underly-
ing the particular legal institutions in a given country, one can determine
the extent to which the rule of law ideal is operative.67 For example,
civil-law countries use the "inquisitorial" approach in criminal trials,
whereas common-law countries use the "accusatorial" approach.6
Though they employ different methods of discovering the truth, both ap-
proaches share the common goal of providing a fair and open trial to the
accused. 9 Therefore, the underlying principle requiring open, impartial
tribunals is an integral part of both legal systems, and both can be said to
operate pursuant to the rule of law.70
In developing this conception of the rule of law, then, the question
becomes: What principles are of such importance that they must be pres-
ent to some degree in some kind of institution or procedure? A require-
ment of minimum substantive content can prevent grotesque parodies of
the rule of law, as seen in the examples of Nazi Germany and Vichy
France. The difficulty, however, is to limit these principles carefully to
avoid the philosophical and political problems inherent in the rights con-
ception. 71 Thus, the foundational normative principles required for the
rule of law must be minimalist-just those necessary to prevent the legal
system from enacting the letter of the rule of law, while trampling its
spirit.
72
What then is the basis for these minimalist normative principles?
Professor John Rawls's theory of justice73 provides some insight. Ac-
cording to Rawls, the minimal substantive content necessary to maintain
the rule of law ideal is that required to ensure "[t]he regular and impar-
66. Id. at 10. Walker justifies this "starting point" by saying: (1) the rule of law must be
meaningful since it has been the subject of debate in common-law countries for centuries; (2)
writers in noncommon-law countries have noted that the rule of law concept is present in
common-law countries; and (3) even critics of rule of law theory say that it exists in common-
law countries. Id
67. Id at 10-11.
68. Id at 11.
69. See id
70. See id Whether these different approaches are equally effective in furthering the un-
derlying purpose-open, impartial tribunals-is a separate inquiry. Id.
71. See INTERNATIONAL COMM'N OF JURISTS, supra note 56, at 65; WALKER, supra note
9, at 5-6.
72. See WALKER, supra note 9, at 5-6. Professor Walker offers a few, specific minimal
"rights" implicit in this approach: the presumption of innocence, the presumption against
retroactive legislation, the right to legal representation, and the right to a fair, speedy, and
public trial. Id. at 5.
73. For a detailed discussion of Rawls's theory of justice, see RAWLS, supra note 10.
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